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INTRODUCTION
Parts I, II, III of conference paper not included in 
presentation due to time constraints.
Part I: How Enterprise Management could assist reform if 
implemented properly. 
Part II: How capabilities thinking, planning and
management play a role in reform. 
Part III: The role of better business practices and
information technology in adding value to DoD
acquisition, resource management and improved
organization strategy. 




These options are relatively 
unconstrained by political feasibility. 
However, feasibility issues are 
addressed. Our goal is to stimulate 
thinking about options that many will 
perceive as “outside the box”
Marginal Adjustment Reform
• Replacement of PPBES with longer 
term capital and performance 
oriented budgeting,
in combination with
• Radical DoD business process 
reengineering 
Elimination of PPBES
• PPBES is an overly bureaucratic and process-
heavy system that interferes with rather than 
facilitates acquisition.
• PPBES is slow and involves too many 
participants, each with his/her own agenda.
• PPBES does not facilitate capital budgeting. 
Also, separate Programming and Budgeting 
processes are not workable in terms of meeting 
the needs of the acquisition work cycle.
• PPBES is time constrained while Acquisition 
operates on a milestone basis. The two systems 
are incompatible.
The Need for Capital Budgeting
• Longer range operations and capital budgeting 
would be more compatible with acquisition decision 
processes.
• Explicit longer range capital budgeting is necessary 
to improve the fit between resource management 
and acquisition.
• The method of capital budgeting adopted should be 
based on private sector methods, modified to fit the 
government context decision processes.
• DoD needs to convince Congress that capital 
budgeting is to its advantage and not just better for 
DOD.
Advantages of Capital Budgeting
• A better planning method for acquisition of long-
lived assets, and more consistent with Enterprise 
Management and performance budgeting.
• Capital budgeting is continuous, not periodic –
better suited to DOD needs.
• More realistic in considering total assets needed 
to meet capability requirements.
• Considers decisions in constant dollars
• Considers total life cycle costs.
• Does not separate program from budget 
decisions.
Why Radical Acquisition Process 
Reengineering?
• The Problem: “The process has become 
the product.”
• Goal: Use only essential processes that 
add value to the product and acquisition 
process.
• One approach to how it could be done is 
as follows:
One option for radical business 
process reengineering
• New business model employing a single, fully 
integrated ERP IT system and database rather 
the multiple systems and databases that 
characterize existing DoD systems. 
• Task of the USD AT&L and small acquisition 
staffs of the MILDEPS to determine the 
capabilities desired for warfighting, informed by 
direct input from military combatant commands. 
Business Process Reengineering: Reducing 
the number of players
• All staff (and work) not involved in program 
execution to be done by small units under 
the USD AT&L, Joint staff and the 
MILDEP secretariats -- about 12 to 20 
people in each staff in total. 
• The milestone decision process would 
suffer the same fate as PPBES, i.e., it 
would be discarded and replaced with a 
radically reengineered process. 
Reengineered Process Specifics: Step 1
1. Proposal of a desired capability by the 
military departments and services. This 
proposal could come from a warfighter 
command or more centrally from the 
military chiefs. The proposal would 
undergo one comprehensive review and 
analysis by the staff of the MILDEP 
acquisition secretariat and then be 
decided upon by the service secretary.
Reengineered Process Specifics: Step 2
2. MILDEP request for capability (not a specific 
system) analyzed simultaneously by 
combination of staffs of USD AT&L and Joint 
Chiefs, with single recommendation issued 
together to USD AT&L for decision. USD AT&L 
decides on a "go or no go" basis to approve/ 
disapprove the capabilities request. This 
decision represents the choice of SECDEF 
• No separate review by SECDEF made except 
where SECDEF takes the initiative to do so.
• Notably, no design specifications would be 
determined at this stage in the process. 
Reengineered Process Specifics: Step 3
3. Once a capabilities request is approved by DoD, the 
private sector is asked to prepare designs and then bid 
their designs and costs for meeting required capability. 
A board representing the combined staffs of USD AT&L, 
Joint Chiefs and MILDEPS reviews private firms 
proposals containing design specifications from them 
with costs estimated to meet requirement –a specific 
platform, system or equipment asset. 
The combined review recommends one or more contractors 
for production, or more bids solicited if no bids are 
satisfactory. 
USD AT&L assesses recommendation from combined 
board and staff review of proposals and decides which to 
accept. 
Reengineered Process Specifics: Step 4
4. Private firm designs/produces asset; RDT&E all by the 
private firm with government oversight of performance 
and cost similar to the current process but with more 
emphasis on product performance & schedule in addition 
to cost to meet required capability.
• Private firm supplies DoD with tested model ready to 
“field” that would be jointly and simultaneously tested by 
the contractor and DoD. 
• Under conditions of contract, DoD has option to accept 
or reject the asset. 
• Primary responsibility for test and evaluation would be by 
the MILDEPS, with oversight from representatives of the 
combined USD AT&L and Joint board, and government 
contract staffs on site. 
Reengineered Process Assumptions
DoD would be constrained to requesting only very 
minimal changes to asset by private firm. 
Changes to be held to strict cost constraint of 
one percent of the per unit cost of asset 
Contracts to extent possible to be fixed price vs. 
incentive based with strict penalties for failure to 
perform within cost and time constraints. 
More financial risk in design and production 
assumed by the private sector instead of 
government (Paper addresses willingness of 
firms to accept such risks).
Reengineered Process Assumptions
• Because contractor expertise would be 
required in training and supervision of the 
use of the asset by warfighters, part of the 
initial contract would include the cost of 
fielding and training with the clear 
requirement that all assets be fully 
supported. 
Evaluating Success of Business
Process Reengineering
• Bottom line for evaluating success of BP 
reengineering is improved customer 
satisfaction (i.e., results). Cycle time and 
cost reduction are not ends in themselves. 
Rather, they are the results of better work 
processes. 
• Metrics are critical to determining whether 
reengineering is successful – they must be 
used to assess gains from new processes.
Comprehensive Reform:
Marketization/privatization of acquisition
• Fundamental concept: open competition to the 
international market for meeting US defense 
asset capability needs to allow acquisition from 
non-US firms.
• What has worked for multi-national corporations 
in taking advantage of international markets can 
work for DOD.
• Protecting US defense firms from foreign 
competition makes them weaker in the long-run.
Marketization/privatization Implications
• Open bidding for defense business to all firms in 
the market, given some exceptions, i.e., favoring 
allied nations.
• Open competition for large as well as smaller 
systems, platforms and weaponry, to selected 
allies such as Canada, European and 
Australasian nations, e.g., Canadian and 
Japanese firms bidding to supply trucks, S. 
Korean firms ships and submarines, European 
firms aircraft for the US military. 
Marketization/privatization
• Recognize that the costs of many platforms and 
systems now under procurement are too high 
and unaffordable in the future.
• Rely more on competitive markets to match 
performance with cost preferences and 
affordability.
• Move towards a “buy” rather than “make”
business model for acquisition of defense assets
• Reduce legal and process constraints built into 
system that discourage competition.
Marketization/privatization Issues
• Supply reliability: given prudent choices among 
suppliers no worse risk than with US firms 
presently.
• Availability of spare parts: under longer range 
and capital budgeting, buy more spares up-front 
to save long-term costs. Also, given prudent 
choices, no worse risk than with US firms 
presently.
• Substitute the expectation of getting the highest 
level of technology for that of getting the best 
technology available at lower costs.
Marketization/privatization Issues
• Continue present trend towards best available 
technology – right now – to meet warfighter 
needs.
• Use off-the-shelf (COTS) products to the 
greatest extent possible, with minimum of 
modification.
• Some modification necessary as is case at 
present, but modifications add to costs.
• Realize the advantages of buying larger 
quantities of lower cost weapons, systems and 
platforms.
The Privatization Component of Reform
• Privatize all business processes in 
defense acquisition that are not essentially 
governmental in nature, i.e., where the 
market provides advantages in price, 
improved quality and cycle time reduction.
• Improved government contracting, 
monitoring and supervision is part of the 
price of increased privatization.
What Probably Should Be Included in Privatization
• Eliminate all government R&D labs (except 
those that do nuclear research). Their work 
would be done by private sector labs.
• Eliminate all shipyards that do not build ships, 
except where the work (repairs) they perform 
can’t be done in the private sector (most of it 
can).
• Reduce the size of the MILDEP Systems 
Commands. Most of the work they do could be 
done in the private sector (where many current 
government employees would find work).
Comprehensive Reform Conclusions: 
Taking Advantage of Markets
• This option is not mutually exclusive from 
proposals for longer-term, capital and 
performance budgeting, and business process 
reengineering. 
• Not all reform options should be undertaken at 
the same time – prioritization is required.
• Expected time for implementation should not be 
less than five years and ten years is probably 
more realistic.
Political Feasibility
• Bureaucratic resistance to replacing PPBES, the 
existing milestone system and to radical 
business process reengineering is predictable. 
Leadership is required to overcome it.
• The argument for capital budgeting has to be 
sold to Congress, i.e., DOD must bear the 
burden of proof that it will result in better 
decisions, some of which Congress can take 
credit for supporting.
Marketization Feasibility
• Resistance from US industry to increased 
foreign competition is inevitable, and 
powerful defense firms have friends in 
Congress. Therefore, DOD again must 
show Congress how through “offsets” and 
other means (reciprocal trade agreements 
with other nations for example) all 
stakeholders will be better off in the long-
run.
Caveats and Comments for Discussion
• The purpose of this paper and presentation is 
more to stimulate discussion than to advocate 
specific options for reform as the “best and only”
options. 
• This is still the beginning, not the end, of the 
defense acquisition and resource management 
reform dialogue.
• If you are interested in the ideas presented 
briefly here, please read our paper.
Questions and Comments?
